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BOOK REVIEWS 
Kierkegaard after Macintyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue, edited by 
John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, with replies by Alasdair Macintyre 
and Philip L. Quinn. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2001. Pp. xxxix 
+ 363. $56.95 (cloth), $26.95 (paper). 
JOHN LIPPITT, University of Hertfordshire, UK. 
This is an unusually interesting and thought-provoking collection of 
essays. What starts off sounding like the narrowest of concerns - how in 
part of one chapter of one of a contemporary philosopher's books, he gets 
the details of one aspect of Kierkegaard's thought wrong - in fact turns out 
to be a very rich seam for ethical enquiry. The editors' leading intuition 
concerns the potential fruitfulness of a dialogue between Kierkegaard and 
those figures in contemporary moral philosophy - Taylor, Williams, 
Frankfurt, Nussbaum and Murdoch are mentioned - who have brought 
back on to the ethical agenda debate about such issues as human flourish-
ing, the moral psychology of the virtues and the conditions under which 
human beings are able to find their lives meaningful and purposeful. I 
share the editors' intuitions about this, and highly commend the way in 
which they set the ball rolling with a dialogue between Kierkegaard and 
one of the most important thinkers in moral philosophy over the past 
twenty or thirty years, Alasdair Macintyre. 
Several contributors argue that Macintyre's representation of 
Kierkegaard in After Virtue is unfair. In chapter 4 of that text - the relevant 
section of which is reproduced here - Macintyre presents Kierkegaard, at 
least in Either/Or, as the irrationalist apostle of "criterionless choice" as the 
only justification for the move from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere of 
existence. In doing so, on Macintyre's story, Kierkegaard is a critical figure 
in the breakdown of the attempt to give an independent rational justifica-
tion of morality, and Either/Or is "a book which is at once the outcome and 
the epitaph" (p. xxxv) of this attempt. Against this background, the essays 
in Part One - all previously published - aim to show in various ways what 
is wrong with this reading, in the process clarifying what the idea of 
authentic 'self-choice' in Either/Or actually amounts to. Amongst the claims 
made here are that Kierkegaard possesses, like Aristotle and neo-
Aristotelianism, a teleological conception of freedom, and that "narrative 
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unity" is an important part of his conception of ethical selfhood. This sec-
tion includes essays by Peter Mehl on Kierkegaard's attempt to take 
human subjectivity seriously without reducing it to mere ethical subjec-
tivism, Jeffrey Turner on narrative and moral truth, Marilyn Piety on 
Kierkegaard's conception of rationality, John Davenport on how 
Kierkegaardian "choice" can be understood through a comparison with 
Harry Frankfurt's conception of "volitional identification," and Gordon 
Marino on the role of reason in Kierkegaard's ethics. Part Two takes fur-
ther arguably the book's most interesting claim: that Kierkegaard's posi-
tion is actually far closer to Macintyre's own than the latter realizes. The 
main burden of many of the essays in Part Two, all but one first published 
here, is to tease out aspects of these positive connections. Finally, Part 
Three consists of interesting critical responses from Philip Quinn and 
Macintyre himself. 
The richness of the issues covered in this volume poses a problem for 
the reviewer. I shall have to be unfair to several contributors by saying lit-
tle or nothing about their essays. I'll concentrate on the newer material in 
Parts Two and Three, but make an exception for one earlier essay, Jeffrey 
Turner's. For Turner, one key aspect of the Kierkegaard-Macintyre debate 
is that Kierkegaard is aware of a serious threat that "narrative theorists or 
... commentators on Macintyre" (p. 43) have overlooked: the seductive 
danger of the" aesthetic." The desire to "tell a good tale" about our lives 
renders us prone to various kinds of self-deception as we try to convince 
ourselves that are lives are more beautiful or interesting than they really 
are. For Turner, such self-deception is manifested by Judge William, who 
"has been carried away with his own story about himself" (p. 51). Though 
his expressed aim is to save the aesthetic validity of marriage, Turner 
argues that he preserves the aesthetic in everyday life only "by offering an 
overly beautiful account of that life" (p. 51). For instance, he seems inade-
quately aware of the potential vulnerability of his own marriage, his atti-
tude towards it being "one of complete confidence" (p. 50). He fails to scruti-
nize his assumption that his own marriage is "the ethical (and aesthetic) 
norm" (p. 53). It is worth noting that when in Dependent Rational Animals 
Macintyre criticizes his own earlier position (from After Virtue to Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry), one of the things for which he takes himself 
to task is precisely this downplaying of the ethical significance of human 
vulnerability. 
The basic threat of the aesthetic lies in its seductive power. If we are, in 
Macintyre's famous phrase, "story telling animals," none of us want to tell 
stories about ourselves that are dull or ugly. I would not want to endorse 
Turner's strange claim that "a minimal condition of the moral truth of the 
stories we tell about ourselves might well be that they can't be boring" (p. 
54), since-to the extent that I understand what he means by "moral 
truth" -I don't see what the truth of a story has got to do with its interest-
value. Indeed, in saying this, Turner risks spoiling one of his best insights. 
His claim that we "cannot help but desire to tell and hear interesting and 
beautiful tales" (p. 54) should surely be seen as a potentially truth-threaten-
ing problem, rather than something to which we need to accede. 
Turner suggests that "moral truth is a certain relation between one's life 
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itself and the stories one tells about one's life" (p. 55). This is fine as far as it 
goes, but what does this claim ultimately amount to? Is it saying any more 
than "avoid dishonesty, hypocrisy and self-deception"? It remains unclear 
who can judge their life as being devoid of these vices, and from what 
standpoint. 
The first essay in Part Two is by Anthony Rudd. With admirable clarity, 
Rudd rebuts Macintyre's "irrationalism" charge by showing Kierkegaard 
as opposed not to rationality per se but only a "certain metaphysical 
mythologisation of reason" (p. 136). Against Macintyre's "criterionless 
choice" objection, Rudd suggests that Judge William is in fact offering an 
argument, to the effect that the aesthetic life cannot provide a coherent 
sense of personal identity; that personal fulfilment is therefore impossible; 
and that it is thus rational for the aesthete to choose the ethical. According 
to Rudd, Judge William's argument in favor of the ethical is basically the 
same as Macintyre's argument in chapter 15 of After Virtue. Rudd notes 
that A himself sometimes describes his life in terms of "despair," a button 
that the Judge likes to press. A's life constitutes despair because it has "no 
principle of unity": it lacks what Macintyre would call a "narrative struc-
ture." For Rudd, "Our lives make sense to us as long as we can tell our-
selves an intelligible story about who we are and what we are doing. To 
lack such a narrative structure in one's life is to lack any stable sense of per-
sonal identity" (pp. 138-9). And this is where A finds himself. 
Rudd clearly shows one of the key connections between Macintyre and 
Judge William, addressing central questions as to what gives meaning to a 
human life. But I have a number of problems with his account, versions of 
which also haunt other contributions. First, notions like "narrative struc-
ture" and "narrative unity," as used by both Macintyre and several con-
tributors, are somewhat vague. In exactly what does the "narrative unity" 
of a life consist? How strong a concept of "unity" is being supposed here, 
and exactly what work is the term "narrative" doing? The concept of "nar-
rative" at work in several of the essays needs to be further clarified. 
"Narrative" is a very broad term, and nothing of much interest follows 
about any given narrative from the mere fact that it is a narrative. To judge 
any given narrative, we need to know what kind of narrative it is: the crite-
ria we would use in judging a historical narrative, for example, are very 
different from those we would use to judge a fictional one. So what are the 
criteria by which a "life narrative" could be judged? Rudd focuses upon 
the importance of intelligibility, but most aesthetes or sensualists could 
surely tell a perfectly intelligible story about their identity and the princi-
ples according to which they live (for pleasure; to avoid boredom; for as 
much anonymous sex as possible). A key problem is that often, the stories 
we tell about ourselves are self-deceived, so a key difficulty is in knowing, 
of any given "life narrative," whether it is honest. But the problem here is 
not one of intelligibility. 
Rudd sees the key argument as a hypothetical one: both Judge William 
and Macintyre argue that if one wishes to live a meaningful life, then ethi-
cal commitments and the cultivation of the virtues will be necessary. And 
he adds that according to Kierkegaard, we do all have a desire for coher-
ence and meaning in our lives. But again, "coherence" and "meaning" are 
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rather slippery terms: what rules out the possibility that the aesthete's life 
has all the "meaning" that he needs? Condemnation of such a life can only 
be made from a viewpoint already signed up to a substantive ethical posi-
tion that he denies. So Macintyre's claim that there is no basis of agreement 
from which aesthete and ethicist can start may be harder to defuse than 
Rudd suggests. Also, both Rudd and the Judge stress A's tacit awareness 
of his own "despair." But this appears to mean that the "hypothetical" 
argument has no power over someone who lacks such awareness, or who 
denies the truth of this description. 
Rudd later points out how far Kierkegaard ultimately wants to go 
beyond Judge William's position. Turner has already given us reason to 
wonder whether the self-deception Rudd and the Judge see in A isn't also 
found in the Judge himself. Similarly, Rudd goes on to consider several 
problems that Kierkegaard sees with the Judge's conventional bourgeois 
morality, which interestingly parallel problems that have been raised in 
respect of Macintyre's own work. These, briefly, are the thoughts that the 
ethical commitments the Judge and Macintyre commend may simply not 
be available to us today (don't they depend upon a more stable communi-
ty, with better defined roles than is seriously possible in contemporary 
society?); the charge that neither of our duo gives us any real way of decid-
ing between competing ethical commitments (to family, friends, work, 
nation, and so on); and the charge that Macintyre's socially-based morality 
allows insufficient room for the free flourishing of the individual (or, to the 
extent that it does, whether it owes more to liberalism than Macintyre him-
self admits). Kierkegaard, Rudd suggests, ultimately held that "the need 
for a strong sense of narrative unity cannot come simply from the occupan-
cy of social roles" (p. 147). We need an overriding telos-purity of heart is 
to will one thing-but only "the good" cuts the mustard. The real choice 
becomes that between the aesthetic and the religious, as the ethical recedes 
from the horizon. (This view is shared by at least one other contributor, 
Bruce Kirmmse, who suggests that the ethical "ultimately appears to col-
lapse" between the aesthetic and the religious, Kierkegaard's initial triad 
becoming replaced by "Christianity vs. everything else" (p. 196).) But in 
that case, what becomes of the claim that the ethical is superior to the aes-
thetic? I finished Rudd's article unclear as to whether he is ultimately 
claiming that Judge William's position really is superior to A's, or whether 
its apparent superiority is actually-for the above reasons-an illusion. 
The remaining six articles in Part II can be grouped in two trios, con-
cerned broadly with theology and moral psychology / virtue theory respec-
tively. In response to the options After Virtue famously presents to us 
("Nietzsche or Aristotle?"), Richard Johnson trades on Derrida and Levinas 
to try to show that Kierkegaard can provide a better critique of Nietzsche 
than does Macintyre. Like Karen Carr and Bruce Kirmmse, Johnson sees 
Macintyre (due largely to his admiration for Aquinas) as underplaying the 
split between Athens and Jerusalem. Carr considers how Kierkegaard's 
treatment of Socrates is used to show how Christianity differs from 
"paganism." She argues that Kierkegaard's view is not just a religious ver-
sion of emotivism, since it holds to the authority of revelation as an 
absolute standard, albeit one beyond human reason. Kirmmse, too, thinks 
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Kierkegaard would view Christianity as a more radical departure from the 
classical heritage than does Macintyre: notions of sin, grace and redemp-
tion are not just revisions to a broadly Aristotelian picture. Yet Kirmmse 
also criticizes Kierkegaard for going too far, inheriting more than he real-
izes from the liberalism against which he sometimes rails. This is especially 
so, for Kirmmse, in respect of his insistence in his late writings that the con-
gregation has become "the ruination of Christianity" (Pap. XI 1 A 189, cited 
on p. 204) and that Christianity is "abolished" once it and the world 
"become friends." Kirmmse wonders what space there is in such an 
"other-worldly" version of Christianity for "the Holy Spirit as the bearer of 
God's community on earth" (p. 205). 
One contentious aspect of Kirmmse's paper is his treatment of the way 
in which how, along with the Christian notion of sin replacing the classical 
notion of error, faith allegedly replaces virtue: that for Kierkegaard, "faith 
is what Christianity puts forth instead of virtue" (p.197). But does this 
mean that there could be no such thing as a Christian virtue ethics? This 
does seem to be Kirmmse's view. Noting Macintyre's remark that humility 
could find no place on the list of Greek virtues, and the fact that Aristotle's 
catalogue of virtues contrast in some respects rather strikingly with those 
of Christianity-consider for example meekness and purity of heart-
Kirmmse wonders "whether it is useful to speak of Christian 'virtues' at 
all," and asserts that "Kierkegaard, it is certain, would have looked with 
disdain or bemusement upon this attempt to cobble together a compromise 
table of virtues comprising both classical and Christian entries" (p. 198). 
But this seems a rather uncharitable picture of what commentators interest-
ed in a dialogue between Kierkegaard and contemporary virtue ethics are 
up to, as the remaining three essays of Part Two attest. 
By considering Kierkegaard's treatment of Claudine in Fru 
Gyllembourg's Two Ages, Norman Lillegard argues that for Kierkegaard 
some varieties of aestheticism are compatible with the possession of virtues. 
Can there, then, be aesthetic virtues, and if so how do they differ from ethi-
cal ones? Lillegard's answer also depends upon a certain kind of appeal to 
narrative. He argues that Claudine is sub-ethical because she does not 
choose her passions, and aims to make sense of how this can be done. 
Lillegard recognizes that choice can play an important role in a life that 
Kierkegaard would not characterize as ethical, so that even a certain kind of 
aesthete can possess" a kind of coherence and narrative unity in her life" (p. 
214). But what Claudine lacks is "the effort whereby she takes what she is 
by nature and history ... [including her passions] ... and consciously tries to 
integrate it into a rational self-concept by reference to which a more or less 
unified life might be achieved" (p. 214). This, for Lillegard, is the essence of 
choice in the Judge'S thought, and Lillegard connects it to Kierkegaard's 
idea of a "life view," life views being "full of conscious teleology, thus full 
of thought in the service of wholeness or unity" (p. 215). 
Ultimately, Lillegard wants to support Anti-Climacus' view that "infi-
nite passions require an infinite object ... capable of consuming all of one's 
interest" (p. 219), a test no human being (or any finite passion) can pass. 
But whatever one thinks of Anti-Climacus' argument here, note that this 
seems to have put Lillegard in a similar position to Rudd. Insofar as any-
BOOK REVIEWS 501 
thing short of an "infinite passion" for an "infinite object" fails the test, it is 
now hard to see in what sense those virtues that Lillegard would count as 
ethical are really any genuine kind of advance on merely aesthetic virtues. 
The general idea seems to be that the former are capable of filling out life 
more than the latter, though I was less than fully convinced as to how the 
division into these categories is being made (Lillegard's distinction 
between romantic and sporting passion underestimates the role of the lat-
ter in some people's lives, and of how it can be an arena for the exercise of 
ethical virtues). However, the focus on "infinite passion" leaves mysteri-
ous, but intriguing, exactly how Lillegard would handle his later claim-
strikingly opposed to Kirmmse's-that "the religious also must be under-
stood in terms of passions and virtues" (p. 231). 
Lillegard certainly raises some vitally important questions about the 
kind of unity or "whole life" at play in claims about how a life needs to be 
unified. I also think that he is on to something important in his focus on 
what he calls "dimensional wholeness" (any adequate answer needs to 
show how the various dimensions of my life-"personal, familial, voca-
tional, civic, religious, and so forth" (p. 227)--can be unified) and "chrono-
logical wholeness" (how can these various passions be ordered over 
time?). I am less convinced by Lillegard's talk of a quest for a life view that 
can "somehow beat all competing life views" (p. 217). 
In the context of Macintyre's discussion of the opposition between the 
aesthetic and ethical worldviews, Edward Mooney's paper makes a valu-
able contribution to reminding us of the kind of moral dialogue that can 
take place between exemplars of the Kierkegaardian existence-spheres. 
Macintyre's treatment, he suggests, underestimates the significance of the 
point that the Judge's writings are not just "an impersonal moral tract for 
just any interested (or idle) reader" (p. 242), but concerned letters to a 
friend. Even if A is unmoved by the Judge's case, it does not follow that no 
moral communication has taken place. Nor does the lack of a resolution 
show that we need immediately run to an "independent rational third 
party," an "independently grounded rational principle" or a moral "super-
framework" (p. 244). A, the Judge and any likely reader will enter the 
scene with certain assumptions in place. Yet there can be degrees of moral 
disagreement, in which two people can share some assumptions and differ 
on others. The fact that ultimately I do not" convert" you to my position in 
an ethical debate does not necessarily mean that we have not learned 
something significant from each other in the interchange. Mooney's essay 
closes with an interesting discussion of the kind of will that Kierkegaard's 
works are intended to encourage in the reader: a will marked by, amongst 
other virtues, humility and yet autonomy of a certain kind. 
Some of the concerns I have raised-all too briefly-about other papers 
are tackled in more detail by the final essay of Part Two, by John 
Davenport. Drawing on a qualified version of some of Frankfurt's work, 
Davenport claims that" all mature human agents wholeheartedly will" 
what he calls" existential coherence": a refashioning of our ground projects 
until they mutually reinforce each other. Such "self-integration and unity 
of life-narrative" (p. 293) is central to the telos of authenticity which lies at 
the heart of the "existential virtue ethics" Davenport wants to draw on 
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Kierkegaard to build. To achieve it, we must unify and integrate "some 
reconcilable subset of worthwhile ends" (p. 293). But one problem here is 
surely how we are to know which ends are harmonious. It may not be until 
my life is nearly over that I can know that, though the ends of being a 
philosopher and being a novelist were compatible for Sartre or Murdoch, 
that in my own case, my pursuit of both has led me to fail in both. 
Davenport, like Rudd and Lillegard, gives a central role to the "unity of 
a narrative with a wide range of diverse themes and subplots" (p. 320). 
But, as I have already suggested, more needs to be said than is said any-
where in the collection about wherein the unity of such a narrative con-
sists. Moreover, it may be that thinking of one's life in narrative terms 
makes one especially prone to supplying neat conclusions and interesting 
connections between events, and the resultant problem of self-deception. 
Furthermore, in his Part Three reply to Lillegard and Davenport, there is 
Philip Quinn's objection that such a unification project may be less impor-
tant than other contributors suppose: in addition, a focus upon it may 
blind us to the importance of appreciating a diversity of values, which may 
itself be a vital component of the "subjective meaningfulness" of a life. 
Quinn's paper is a real bonus for the collection, since it challenges head-on 
the assumption made by many of the other contributors, and the editors 
acknowledge in their introduction the need to take on board Quinn's sug-
gestion that the Apollonian focus on unity of purpose needs to be comple-
mented by a more Dionysian vision of the self as a chorus of voices that do 
not always sing in harmony. 
Davenport acknowledges that "The hard problem is to interpret correctly 
the difference between right and wrong kinds of diversity in a life of multiple 
devotions, vocations and cares" (p. 320). This is indeed hard, but it seems to 
me the absolute crux of the matter, on which the "narrative unity" story is 
going to stand or fall. Unless the supporters of this view have an answer to 
this question, I'm not sure exactly what they are telling us. Exactly what is 
the difference, for instance, between Davenport's view and Quinn's sugges-
tion that we should "welcome plural values into our lives, risking the possi-
bility of tragic conflict among them, and to manage the inevitable tensions 
as creatively and skilfully as we can" (p. 333)? Are the supporters of the nar-
rative unity view recommending that we avoid such risk? If so, to what 
degree; how are we to avoid the slippery slope towards monomania? 
Finally, a generous-spirited reply from Macintyre himself makes 
numerous concessions to his critics, but states a revised version of his 
original charge. Although the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical 
can be justified retrospectively, a recognition of the superiority of the ethi-
cal cannot act prospectively as the motive for an aesthete's life-changing 
choice. This seems in harmony with some of the worries I have sketched 
with excessive brevity above. 
In conclusion, this fascinating collection clearly demonstrates both 
Kierkegaard and Macintyre to be concerned with issues of fundamental 
human concern. Macintyre expresses the hope that the conversation will 
continue; the editors express their confidence that it will. I feel sure that 
both the hope and the expectation are well-founded. 
